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Professor Wolfe’s paper is a valuable reminder of how strongly many 
thoughtful people regard the risks of legally recognizing relationships 
they socially oppose.1  Those who thought that the Federal Marriage 
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
 1. Christopher Wolfe, Why the Federal Marriage Amendment is Necessary, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 895 (2005).  In the revised version, Professor Wolfe responds to 
some of the arguments made herein.  The author of the principal paper deserves the last 
say, and I expect readers can guess the sort of points that might be made in rebuttal.  I 
will say a word about his claim to regard homosexuals with equal concern and respect,  a 
claim supported by his argument that society should devote some measure of public 
wealth and power, the precise mix unspecified here, to the project of “helping” 
homosexuals “see the disorder in their sexual attractions,”  to “prevent the formation of 
same-sex attractions” and to  “offer possibilities for changing them, where possible.”  Id. 
at text accompanying note 97.  I am quite unscandalized by this commendably honest 
passage, but it seems to me that Professor Wolfe avoids the charge of indifference to the 
well-being of gay people only by embarking on one of two highly dubious paths. 
The first path combines a strong and frighteningly confident form of paternalism with 
a view of well-being that gives little, if any, weight to pleasure and misery in the assessment 
of welfare.  The second path rejects the revealed preferences of the empirical homosexual in 
favor of preferences imputed to a hypothetical heterosexual otherwise identical to the 
empirical self.  This latter path attempts the “monstrous impersonation” of “equating 
what X would choose if he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X 
actually seeks and chooses, [the equation that] is at the heart of all political theories 
of self-realization.”  Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERALISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 15, 24–25 (Michael Sandel ed., 1984).  As Berlin says, “[e]nough manipulation 
with the definition of man, and freedom can be made to mean whatever the manipulator 
wishes.  Recent history has made it only too clear that the issue is not merely academic.”  Id. 
at 25. 
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Amendment (FMA) had served its purpose by energizing Religious Right 
support for the Administration in the late election have, it would appear, 
another thing coming.  Some folks evidently take social issues as 
seriously as war and peace. 
Disagreement on these issues runs the risk of escalating up the ladder 
of generality until the conversation gets to the nature of Truth or the 
existence of God, both sides claiming victory after putting the burden of 
proof on the other.  In the hope of teasing out some strands of public 
reason from the considerable intellectual horsepower Professor Wolfe 
has invested in his cause, I decline to initiate any such tedious escalation 
of contesting premises. 
What I choose to pursue are certain tensions within the case for 
the Federal Marriage Amendment.  Perhaps these do not amount to 
contradictions in the most formal sense.  They do, however, suggest that 
something odd is going on with public reason when it comes to 
homosexuality.  So I offer to add to the familiar yet evolving conversation 
about gay unions, both the rather critical point that Professor Wolfe 
makes his case not wisely but too well, and the more positive point that 
our public discourse may yet overcome the derangement apparently 
produced in otherwise cogent minds by the open admission that the 
conversation not only involves, but includes, people who like gay sex. 
I.  THE FIRST TENSION: MARRIAGE IS BOTH FRAGILE AND 
FUNDAMENTAL 
Professor Wolfe premises the case for the FMA on the idea that the 
impending recognition of gay marriage imperils marriage as an 
institution—a result that would undermine one of society’s most critical 
foundations.  The two halves of this claim, however, resist one another.  
If traditional marriage has served society well for millennia, it seems 
highly unlikely that gay marriage is going to do the institution grave 
damage. 
Indeed, it is not entirely clear what FMA advocates mean by damage, 
or through what causal mechanisms this damage might be done.  No-fault 
divorce entered American life in the decade before the Stonewall riots 
inaugurated the modern movement for gay rights.  The no-fault movement 
reflected a social consensus that forcing partners to remain together after 
at least one of them desires a separation does more harm than good.  The 
 
For my part I would prefer to be told I am being sacrificed for the greater good after an 
honest Benthamite balancing than to be told either that I and my potential partners are 
really better off in a permanent state of sexual frustration, or that I am being herded into 
therapy by the better angels of my nature, assisted rather than compelled by the external 
pressures of a well-meaning majority. 
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roots of that consensus grew out of basic demographic facts of a rather 
good sort; people were living longer and enjoying more opportunities.  
Women saw labor markets opening up, and oral contraceptives gave 
heterosexuals new options for recreational sex.  As marital wealth grew, 
divorce became more affordable.  These changes continue to this day, 
and they have no obvious connection to the legal rights of gays and 
lesbians. 
If we compare marriage to other important institutions, we may be 
hard pressed to explain exactly how gay marriage might undermine 
marriage as an institution.  Open homosexuals are excluded, whether de 
jure or de facto, from the military, from some posts in some churches, 
and from playing the most popular professional spectator sports.  Open 
homosexuals are allowed to vote and stand for office, to hold property 
and enforce contracts, and to serve on juries.  I do not see the majority 
culture avoiding democratic politics, disregarding property rights, or 
attacking trial by jury.  I do see front page stories about the behavior of 
our forces at Abu Ghraib prison, about the Catholic Church paying 
millions of dollars to settle sexual abuse lawsuits, and about major 
league baseball’s steroid scandal.  Which of these important institutions 
is in better shape; democratic politics, private property, and jury trial, or 
marriage, the Church, baseball, and the military?  If the answer is “I 
don’t know” or “impossible to tell,” have the FMA advocates made the 
kind of showing that ought to precede a constitutional amendment? 
Thus far I have treated the causal connection between gay marriage 
and marriage-as-institution as one unmediated by personal decisions of 
the sort that break the normatively relevant chain of causes.  There comes a 
point, however, when but-for causes lose their normative relevance; a 
murderer’s parents caused the victim’s death but are not responsible for 
it.  Many things give people reasons not to get married, or to divorce 
once married.  If retirement funds are doing very well, we may see some 
scrupulously-controlled study showing an effect on marriage or divorce 
rates.  Is this a reason to isolate retirement fund performance as a family 
law issue?  If all such changes do is increase or decrease the range of 
options people considering marriage or divorce have to choose from, can 
those who change the menu be held accountable for what others choose 
from that menu? 
Suppose Professor Wolfe is asked to speak about the state of marriage 
as an institution in Denmark, or some other jurisdiction where gay 
marriage has been sanctioned by positive law.  What should he say?  
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“Well, good people, time to give up.  Copulate like bonobos,2 and devil 
take the children!  Nothing any of you might do, or fail to do, can save 
marriage-as-institution.”  I find this implausible, and so illuminating.  Gay 
people are not responsible for the choices straight people make about 
their relationships.  Suppose Alexander and Allison say: “We would have 
gotten married, but we heard that Ben and Bill got hitched, so it’s rather 
a rum go and all off.”  Who is to blame here?  Ben and Bill?  Denmark?  
Or God forbid, the straight folks who take state-sanctioned gay marriage as 
an excuse to bypass otherwise applicable moral standards?  At best it 
sounds like a remote and feeble version of the abuse excuse, an excuse 
the moralistic right condemns as a decadent flight from responsibility 
even when the causal process operates personally and violently on the 
person whose behavior is modified.3 
In the gay marriage context, the influence on straight folks would be 
nonviolent and exemplary, not the sort of pressure that should permit the 
straight-but-not-married or straight-married-but-divorcing to plead as an 
excuse.  Reverse the situation for purposes of illustration.  Suppose Ben 
says to Bill: “Well, we can’t get married, so I might as well beat you 
up.”  Who is to blame: Ben, the state, or Alexander and Allison? 
Now compare the causally and morally speculative damage gay 
marriage might do with the manifestly robust history of marriage as an 
institution.  Marriage has survived the Huns, the Vandals, the Visigoths, 
and the Mongols; smallpox, the Black Death, Spanish flu and AIDS; 
slavery, the Holocaust, and the gulag archipelago; the French 
Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the 
sexual revolution; global war, Cold War, and the War on Terror.  But 
marriage, we are told, stands no chance against the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts. 
Convicted felons may lose the right to vote,4 but not the right to 
marry.5  Wife-beaters, rapists, pimps, and pornographers may wed with 
the law’s approval.  The drug dealer can marry the child abuser because 
they’re straight, but the accountant can’t marry the doctor because 
they’re gay.  If marriage can survive the drug dealer marrying the child 
abuser, it can probably weather the storm of the accountant marrying the 
doctor. 
 
 2. The bonobo chimpanzees have been called “the horniest apes on Earth.”  
Susan Block, The Bonobo Way, http://www.blockbonobofoundation.org (last visited 
June 24, 2005). 
 3. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE 
THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997). 
 4. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 5. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that the state may not deny 
incarcerated prisoners the right to marry).  Felons never imprisoned or released from 
custody presumably have the same right. 
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Marriage as an institution faces far more serious challenges than gay 
marriage.  People will continue to enjoy longer, healthier, and richer 
lives.  As they do so, they are likely to see both stronger reasons to 
divorce and weaker reasons to remain married.  No one, outside al Qaeda, is 
seriously against the demographic dynamics.  I find it as difficult to 
believe that marriage as an institution is headed for the scrapheap of 
anthropology, as I find it difficult to believe that people will remain in 
happy, monogamous marriages for thirty, forty, or fifty years after their 
last child reaches the age of majority.  What I find quite easy to believe 
is that marriage as an institution will evolve pragmatically, much as it 
has in the past.  I see no reason why experiments with same-sex 
marriages should be excluded by fiat from the evolutionary process. 
If the silence of FMA proponents about the pressures put on marriage 
by modernity’s positive side is understandable, there is no excuse at all 
for the silence, all around, about some of the manifestly bad things in 
modern life that happen to put stresses on marriages at the retail level, 
and so, ultimately, on marriage as an institution at the wholesale level.  
The urgency of the Paul Revere style warnings about gay marriage 
stands in surreal contrast to the majority culture’s smug complacency 
about such genuine threats to durable and happy marriages as adultery, 
substance abuse, compulsive gambling, and domestic violence.  Those 
are evils undermining millions of marriages, evils that get a political 
pass because they happen to be practiced by the general, mostly 
heterosexual, population. 
If marriage as an institution finally becomes dysfunctional for most 
ordinary people, that outcome will have more to do with causes such as 
these than it will with how the legal system handles same-sex couples.  
The obsessive focus on gay marriage reflects any number of sociopolitical 
pathologies, but indifference to the real risk factors attending modern 
marriage may well rank first among them. 
II.  THE SECOND TENSION: ACTIVIST JUDGES THREATEN TRADITIONAL 
MARRIAGE, SO MARRIAGE SHOULD BE DEFINED BY FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The FMA’s proponents claim that a constitutional amendment is 
necessary to prevent activist judges from forcing gay marriage on an 
unwilling polity.  Thus far, no court has held that the federal Constitution 
requires gay marriage, and only one has held that a state constitution 
requires gay marriage. 
DRIPPS.DOC 8/7/2019  12:43 PM 
 
940 
The continued suspicion of the courts seems a relic from some past 
age.  The most liberal justice on the Supreme Court may well be John 
Paul Stevens, who was appointed by Gerald Ford.  Anthony Kennedy, 
who spoke for the majority in Romer and Lawrence, is a self-identifying 
Catholic appointed by Ronald Reagan.6  The Georgia Supreme Court 
rejected Bowers v. Hardwick before the U.S. Supreme Court did likewise in 
Lawrence.7  If you cannot trust Reagan appointees or the Supreme Court 
of Georgia, you cannot trust anybody, which seems to be a leit motif in 
arguments for the amendment. 
Whenever I hear the phrase “liberal judges,” I can’t help thinking 
about Elmer Fudd’s permanent paranoia about that “wascally wabbit” 
Bugs Bunny.  Perhaps we need a new term for the judicial activists who 
exist more in the minds of social conservatives than in the chambers of 
appellate courts: “wiberal wudges” should do nicely. 
The claim that “wiberal wudges” will foist gay marriage on the 
electorate seems like an unlikely prediction.  Nevertheless, those who 
accept that claim ought to oppose the FMA, because the FMA entrusts 
the definition of marriage to those same activist judges.  The amendment 
provides as follows: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a 
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be 
construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred 
upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.8 
What does “the union of a man and a woman” mean? 
Here we must consider what proponents of the amendment, such as 
Professor Wolfe, are saying.  Marriage, in his view, has an essence that 
cannot be changed by positive law to the contrary.9  A same-sex marriage 
is conceptually impossible, and will remain so even when a legal system 
as sophisticated and humane as Canada’s embraces a different meaning 
of the word.10  Thus any legislation, in any jurisdiction under the power 
 
 6. See The Supreme Court Historical Society, Anthony M. Kennedy,  http://www. 
supremecourthistory.org/myweb/justice/kennedy.htm (last modified Mar. 2, 2000) 
(“Kennedy remains a devout adherent to the Roman Catholic faith in which he was 
raised.”). 
 7. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 8. S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005).  That is the latest version, apparently amended 
to permit legislatures, but not courts, to recognize civil unions, as distinct from marriage. 
It is by no means clear that judges could not construe the second sentence to invalidate 
civil unions as well; after all, the commonsense appeal of the civil union arrangement is 
to create the functional equivalent of marriage under a different label. 
 9. See Wolfe, supra note 1, at 910.  
 10. At this writing, the liberal government plans to introduce legislation authorizing 
gay marriage.  With the expected cooperation of two other parties the measure seems likely to 
pass.  See CBC News, Liberals to Introduce Same-Sex Marriage Bill in January, 
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of the proponents, that departs from the conceptual essence of marriage 
is to be unconstitutional. 
Note that jurisdictions under the power of the proponents include not 
only states with electoral majorities that might support gay marriage 
now, but future majorities in perpetuity, regardless of experience, and 
regardless of how large a majority might support gay marriage in any 
individual state.  Professor Wolfe’s agenda is not to abide by the popular 
will, but to achieve a particular policy result without regard to majority 
sentiment. 
So, for Professor Wolfe, federal pluralism is no more tolerable than 
temporal pluralism with respect to the definition of marriage.11  It will 
not do for Massachusetts to vary from Mississippi.  This rejection of 
federal pluralism is profoundly ironic, for the amendment would leave 
the natural law meaning of marriage to be determined for every 
jurisdiction in the country by a majority of the United States Supreme 
Court.  You will recall that these are the same activist judges whose 
crytocratic tendencies require the amendment in the first place.  Now 
think for a bit about what activist judges, aided and abetted by clever 
lawyers, might find in the text and history of the FMA.12 
To begin with, the age of consent to marry would be fixed by judicial 
decision, because the meaning of man and woman would be made a 
question of federal constitutional law.  Below a certain age a union of 
two persons would be one involving a boy and/or a girl.  Does the 
 
http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2004/12/09/martin-samesex041209.html (last updated 
Dec. 10, 2004). 
The Canadian government has come to the conclusion that pluralism among the 
provinces is, for pragmatic reasons, unworkable, an important but debatable point quite 
different from the conceptual claim advanced by Professor Wolfe.  The closest that 
Professor Wolfe comes to advancing some sort of pragmatic claim for national 
uniformity in marriage standards is an expressed dread that those now opposed to gay 
marriage might see the sun come up the day after it arrives.  See Wolfe, supra note 1, at 
909–10.  
 11. Id. at 909. (“The ready acceptance of a checkerboard pattern of state policies 
either does not understand, or, more likely, simply doesn’t agree with the justification for 
defending certain essential features of marriage.”) 
 12. In this symposium, Brian Bix reminds us that legal academics have limited 
expertise related to questions of social policy.  See Brian H. Bix, Everything I Know 
About Marriage I Learned from Law Professors, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 827–31 
(2005).  It seems to me that we might well distinguish between the questions of 
whether legal academics should have the last word on gay marriage and whether we 
should be contributing to the debate.  For example, legal academics really do have a 
comparative advantage in considering how a proposed constitutional amendment 
might be interpreted. 
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amendment authorize a thirty-year-old male to marry a four-year-old 
female?  Presumably not.  Jurisdictional pluralism being rejected by 
the amendment, some age must be selected at which young people 
across the nation may enter wedlock, the legislation of a given state 
notwithstanding.  Perhaps impressed by the centrality of reproduction to 
the conception of marriage urged by some FMA proponents,13 the judges 
might conclude that anyone who has reached a stage of physical fertility 
has reached the age of consent.  Then again, the judges might reason that 
marriage is a solemn undertaking not to be made by anyone still too 
youthful to be trusted with beer, and fix the age at twenty-one.  Want the 
answer in a hurry?  Ask your local federal district judge.14 
Then there is the rather more striking problem of saying what 
conditions are essential to a union of the sort that constitutes marriage.  
The amendment explicitly excludes same-sex and polygamous marriages; 
does it exclude some other arrangements by implication?  For instance, 
an adult mother and son might claim the right to marry, notwithstanding 
a state statute to the contrary, on the theory that the plain meaning of the 
new constitutional text requires only that the couple demanding marriage 
from the state consist of a man and a woman.  Another couple might 
make a similar argument to overcome state laws that prevent a valid 
marriage when one, or both, of the partners is legally insane.  So might 
a couple who openly admit that one has entered the marriage for a 
specific price paid to secure the other’s immigration status, and who 
expressly disclaim any interest in consummating the marriage sexually 
or otherwise. 
In each of these cases, the petitioners are undeniably a man and a 
woman.  After the amendment, marriage in the United States, the laws of 
any state notwithstanding, shall consist only of the union of a man and a 
woman.  The textual argument is straightforward; any man and any 
woman, not currently in some other union of a man and a woman, have a 
constitutional right to marry.  Limitations excluding some unions of a 
 
 13. Robert George, for instance, defends the Judeo-Christian understanding of 
marriage as a bodily, emotional, and spiritual union of one man and one woman, ordered 
to the generating, nurturing, and educating of children, marked by exclusivity and 
permanence, and consummated and actualized by acts that are reproductive in type, even 
if not, in every case, in fact.  A Clash of Orthodoxies, FIRST THINGS: MONTHLY J. 
RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, Aug.–Sept. 1999, at 33, available at http://orthodoxytoday.org/ 
articlesprint/GeorgeClashOrthodoxiesP.htm. 
 14. Would a surviving partner who entered into marriage, perhaps decades before 
the death of the supposed spouse, at an age sanctioned by state law but contrary to the 
federal judiciary’s interpretation of a man and a woman be denied rights under state 
wrongful death or estate laws?  Or would a marriage, invalid when contracted, become 
valid when the parties arrive at the age of eligibility set under the new constitutional 
definition of marriage?  Again, ask your friendly local federal district judge. 
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man and a woman from marriage in the United States either do not exist 
or are to be left to judicial implication. 
If there are unions of a man and a woman that do not constitute 
marriages under the amendment, where does the process of exclusion, on 
textually unenumerated grounds, end?  It ends where the courts say it 
ends, but on the view of proponents, these are activist judges, unworthy 
of trust.  What is to stop them from saying that there is no such thing as 
a union terminable at will by either party (an argument Lincoln made 
about the union proclaimed in our Constitution)?  What is to stop them 
from saying that no genuine union can exist without an equal sharing of 
property among the spouses, regardless of what state law or antenuptial 
contracts may provide?  Or that any genuine union requires more or less 
than state law requires by way of child support or maintenance?  Or that 
there can be no real union of man and woman absent the possibility of 
producing children? 
The activist judges, you say, will be stopped by original intent?  That 
begs the question of just what the intentions of the amendment’s 
proponents are with respect to these questions.  Suppose that intentions 
were clear on some of these issues.  According to FMA proponents, 
activist judges are not stopped now by original intent; why should that 
change?  Indeed, if an elitist judiciary is hell-bent on gay marriage, we 
can expect the amendment to be given the most unpopular construction 
by the courts, for such interpretations would offer a promising route to 
forcing the public to repeal the FMA and return the insidious gay 
marriage conspiracy to its present posture of incipient triumph. 
Divorce litigants are notoriously dogged.  The amendment gives them 
a federal forum to vent their spleens on, with no clear answers to the 
issues they are certain to raise.  Justifying this result on the theory that 
self-willed judges stand poised to usurp legitimate legislative prerogatives 
fails the most minimal tests of rationality.  The premise is not true, and 
even if it were, it would counsel against, rather than in favor, of defining 
marriage in the Constitution of the United States. 
III.  THE THIRD TENSION: THE CONSTITUTION, PROPERLY 
UNDERSTOOD, PROTECTS RELIGIOUS, BUT NOT                                               
SEXUAL, EXPERIENCE FROM STATE                                                     
INTERFERENCE 
Professor Wolfe’s essay brings together some familiar themes: an 
admitted religious motivation, hostility to sexual freedom, and an appeal 
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to our Constitution’s founders.  To invoke the authority of the Framers 
as constitutional authority, and to claim special constitutional rights for 
organized religion or religious exercise, as I think Professor Wolfe 
plainly does, is to announce title to a doctrinal cake and then serve the 
same for a celebratory dessert. 
Technically there is something a bit off with Professor Wolfe’s argument; 
he is hostile to Roe, but the FMA would do nothing about Roe.15  Rather, 
the absence of language to undo Roe in an amendment on social issues 
might well be seen as cementing abortion rights—hardly Wolfe’s 
purpose.  Let us nonetheless take seriously his more general hostility to 
the judicial recognition of textually-unenumerated rights, together with 
the rather vague originalism in which that hostility is wrapped. 
That the Framers did not overtly proclaim an atomistic liberal order 
hostile to all known religions is not much of a surprise.  It is equally 
clear that they did not embrace the particulars of any specific faith.  
What exact precepts, from which known religions, did they agree on, 
and agree on so strongly that these should be read into the warp and 
woof of the Constitution even without specific textual support?  
Answering this sort of counterfactual question seems to condense to 
remolding the Founders in the image of how one wishes one’s neighbors 
to behave.  Which Founders does Professor Wolfe have in mind?  The 
flirtatious Washington?  The amorous Franklin?  The adulterous Hamilton?  
Jefferson, perhaps? 
For reasons I’ve always found suspicious, ancestor-worship in 
American constitutional rhetoric seems to stop with the revolutionary 
generation.  I’m suspicious because that generation acted at a remove of 
time, and at a level of generality, that permits the ancestor-worshipers to 
worship themselves.  The Civil War generation is much more like us, 
and so less congenial. 
But the Civil War generation made the country.  They dealt with the 
specter of devolution, and the monster of slavery, that the revered 
Founders had found fit either to neglect or to nurture.  Their constitutional 
ecology is far closer to ours, and it is that ecology that governs both my 
rights and obligations in relation to the state of California, and Professor 
Wolfe’s rights and obligations in relation to the state of Wisconsin. 
What provision of the Constitution prohibits California from 
punishing my gay sex life as a crime?  It is the same provision of the 
Constitution that prohibits Wisconsin from punishing Professor Wolfe’s 
spiritual life as a crime.  The First Amendment has nothing to do with 
Wisconsin, except to the extent that the Fourteenth Amendment makes 
the First Amendment’s provisions applicable to Wisconsin. 
 
 15. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Before the Civil War, the general police authority of states was 
understood to permit local majorities to both support established 
churches, and to regulate religious exercises; nothing in the federal 
Constitution was thought to stand in the way.16  Not until Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, decided after the outbreak of the Second World War, did 
religious liberty against the states become enforceable in federal courts.17  
Further, the theory of the Cantwell case, like that of Pierce, Near, and 
Gitlow, was that the sometimes-maligned doctrine of substantive due 
process includes, in the ranks of fundamental freedoms, the rights of 
conscience and expression.18  Substantive due process, however, is the 
same doctrine that supports Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence.19   Professor 
 
 16. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309–10 (1963) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting): 
    As a matter of history, the First Amendment was adopted solely as a limitation 
upon the newly created National Government. The events leading to its adoption 
strongly suggest that the Establishment Clause was primarily an attempt to insure 
that Congress not only would be powerless to establish a national church, but 
would also be unable to interfere with existing state establishments.  See 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 440–41.  Each State was left free to go its 
own way and pursue its own policy with respect to religion.  Thus Virginia from 
the beginning pursued a policy of disestablishmentarianism. Massachusetts, by 
contrast, had an established church until well into the nineteenth century. 
    So matters stood until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, or more 
accurately, until this Court’s decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut, in 1940.  310 
U.S. 296.  In that case the Court said: “The First Amendment declares that 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.  The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered 
the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.” 
(footnotes and parallel citations omitted).  See also Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 
(1845) (rejecting free exercise challenge to ordinance prohibiting display of corpses 
pursuant to funeral rites of bona fide religious faith). 
 17. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 18. See id. at 303.  “We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the 
appellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that 
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.”  Id. (internal 
footnote omitted).  The supporting footnote cites Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 
(1939), which in turn cites Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  Gitlow cites 
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), a notorious substantive due process case that 
prompted Holmes, in dissent, to reiterate his disagreement with Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905).  See also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 413 U.S. 113 
(1973), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).   
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Wolfe, like Samson, aims to pull down the house of the Philistines.20  
Unlike Samson, it is not at all clear that he realizes he stands inside it. 
Those who, fancying themselves more clever in the pursuit of a given 
result than the justices and the lawyers for the parties, look for some 
alternative constitutional hook for religious rights against the states 
(privileges or immunities is the usual dodge) are invoking some other 
constitutional chancellor’s foot, rather than a specific textual provision 
protecting religion against state (as opposed to federal) interference.21  
Any theory of privileges or immunities that carries the modern burden of 
freedom of religion, and the clearly-intended contemporary burden of 
protecting private law rights to hold and convey property, enforce 
contracts, and so on, has no textually specified limits.  One may approve 
or disapprove of sodomy or baptism, but the constitutional theory 
immunizing both practices from state interference is the same.22  At least 
substantive due process has the advantage of prohibiting de jure racial 
segregation in Washington, D.C., which no provision in the Fourteenth 
Amendment possibly could do. 
What does this have to do with the debate over the Federal Marriage 
Amendment?  Much; for ordinarily, the case for a constitutional 
amendment is based on some failure of omission or commission in the 
Constitution.  The rhetoric put forth by Professor Wolfe is quite different; 
the Constitution is fine, only the judges need correcting.  Though, the 
error he says the judges have fallen into is one that Professor Wolfe 
would be loathe for them to undo, unless he is eager to test the electoral 
power of his faith against the electoral power of the adherents to the 
other religions, the atheists open or disguised, and such shifting alliances 
as they might make amongst one another in his despite. 
 
 20. Judges 16:26–30. 
 21. On the privileges-or-immunities strategy, the Lochner problem, and possible 
approaches to it, see, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: 
Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 22. Others more sympathetic to religion than I have come to similar conclusions 
from the cases.  See Jay S. Bybee, Substantive Due Process and Free Exercise of 
Region: Meyer, Pierce, and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 887, 
891 (1996): 
[T]he constitutional bases for parental rights and free exercise claims in the 
1920s were more closely connected than we might have thought at first glance. 
Indeed, for the Court in that era, free exercise rights were substantive due 
process rights.  Deciding Meyer and Pierce on the basis of parental rights, 
rather than free exercise grounds, imposed few additional intellectual costs on 
the Court and, importantly, absolved the Court of some difficult questions 
surrounding the relationship between the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  
Like the Court’s earlier substantive due process cases, Meyer and Pierce are 
without constitutional rigor, thereby giving the Court great flexibility to 
support benevolent causes. 
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Substantive due process is logical, historically plausible, and dangerously 
empty.23  Its very emptiness invites the likes of Professor Wolfe to fill 
the vacuum with their personal preferences, treat this invasion as natural, 
and dismiss any other suggested content as illegitimate judicial usurpation.  
Perhaps I have misunderstood him; he may yet, I suppose, offer some 
un-loaded theory that justifies Cantwell without countenancing Griswold 
(for after Griswold, the jump to Lawrence is a short one, however many 
hurdles might stand between Griswold and Roe, or between Lawrence 
and Goodridge).  If he cannot produce such a theory, however, I shall 
feel compelled to conclude that, however revolting we may find it, he 
and I are, for purposes of constitutional law, in bed with each other. 
IV.  THE OMISSION 
Professor Wolfe and I disagree about many things besides the FMA.  
Those who subscribe to a comprehensive view similar to his are not 
likely to be persuaded by anything I have to say about comprehensive 
views.  I offer, however, the narrower suggestion that, if Professor Wolfe’s 
premises lead to his chosen result only after intellectual maneuvers of 
the sort reviewed herein, something is not quite right somewhere. 
This suggestion assumes that the previous arguments about the 
awkward tensions in the case for the FMA are well taken; if those claims 
are wrong, well then, this is just another waste of paper.  If those claims 
are well taken, we well might ask whether the thing that is not quite right 
is the comprehensive view, or its application to homosexuality, a subject 
that seems to derange otherwise rational discourse across wide sections 
of American opinion. 
Sometimes what goes unsaid is as important as what gets said.  
Professor Wolfe concerns himself with the nominal purity of marriage 
and with promoting the good life in some highly abstract sense.  He has 
nothing to say about what might be good for gay people,24 about how 
 
 23. For a fuller discussion of my views on substantive due process, see DONALD A. 
DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE 133–36, 153–55 (2003). 
 24. It may well be that marriage would be bad for gay people, or that the good of 
opening marriage to gay people is outweighed by damage to the interests of other 
persons.  For instance, gay marriages might be less durable than straight marriages, and 
it might be true of marriage and divorce, as Sparky Anderson said of baseball, “that 
losing hurts worse than winning feels good.”  Then again, it may be that marriage’s 
monopoly on legal recognition of personal relationships should be revised to reflect the 
contingent relationship between conjugality and caregiving.  Opening marriage to gays 
might strengthen this undesirable monopoly.  On these sorts of questions I remain 
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some regard for our welfare and happiness should influence public 
policy.  Our emotional lives, our material interests, and our political 
dignity merit no discussion.  We are, for all he has to say about us, mere 
means to the end of preserving marriage for the benefit of others. 
That view is common enough.  Its very meanness seems rather at odds 
with the teachings of Jesus, although in tendering that suggestion I 
immediately admit to being profoundly out of my depth.  I feel less out 
of my depth in suggesting that second-class citizenship is at odds with 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Indeed, I have always regarded the inclusiveness 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s first section as one of the proudest 
achievements of American constitutionalism.  Whatever the stakes in the 




agnostic.  What I object to in Professor Wolfe’s paper is the failure to acknowledge that 
we as a polity should count the welfare of homosexuals, no more nor less than we count 
the welfare of other persons. 
